Research reported by Thomas Homer-Dixon characterizes five social effects that can significantly increase the likelihood of violence in the emerging world, effects that are far deeper than can be controlled by security forces: (1) constrained agricultural production, often in ecologically marginal regions; (2) constrained economic productivity, mainly affecting people who are highly dependent on environmental resources and who are ecologically and economically marginal; (3) migration of these affected people in search of better lives; (4) greater segmentation of society, usually along existing ethnic cleavages; and (5) AND VIOLENCE 80 (1999). lessen these tensions. Part III concludes with a suggestion for a recharacterization of the corporation in a way to sensitize it to the ecological-mindedness necessary to address the potential issues of violence in societies.
officers. At least in liberal societies, which most of the richest countries of the world emulate, 19 extra security measures are likely to be a necessary but insufficient component of a solution toward the kind of stability needed for business to thrive. Indeed, research reported by Thomas Homer-Dixon characterizes five social effects that can significantly increase the likelihood of violence in the world, and are more complex than can be controlled by security forces: (1) constrained agricultural production, often in ecologically marginal regions; (2) constrained economic productivity, mainly affecting people who are highly dependent on environmental resources and who are ecologically and economically marginal; (3) migration of these affected people in search of better lives; (4) greater segmentation of society, usually along existing ethnic cleavages; and (5) disruption of institutions, especially the state. 20 These kinds of social effects create tensions that can erupt in violent expression. It is difficult to envision how additional security forces will solve the embedded social problems that link violence with economic, social, ethnic, and even religious frustrations.
This Article seeks to address these concerns. Section I elaborates ways in which these issues of violence manifest themselves in a globalized economy. Section II discusses the business implications of these tensions and suggests a way in which business can be a mediating actor to lessen these tensions. Section III addresses a related issue concerning war and disease.
The Article concludes with a suggestion for a recharacterization of the corporation in a way to sensitize it to the ecological issues necessary to address the potential issues of violence in societies.
I. The Relationship Between the Physical Environmental and War
This section describes four ways in which ecological issues connect with warfare and directly impact violence. These involve: (1) resource scarcity resulting in competition for resources; (2) exacerbation of identity-based tensions, resulting from either competition for scarce resources or from ecological degradation; (3) the impact of disease either as a weapon in its own right or as a consequence of the degradation of infrastructure; and (4) broader issues of sustainability in the face of increasing populations and increasing industrialization. 19 
See generally AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003) (arguing that the simultaneous adoption of majority-rule democracies and free markets is a recipe for violent, ethnic clashes in developing countries). 20 THOMAS HOMER-DIXON, ENVIRONMENT, SCARCITY, AND VIOLENCE 80 (1999).

A. Resource Scarcity and Implications for Business
Contests among nations and states for valuable resources are nothing new. Much of colonial history resonates with the drive for acquisition of material goods, whether gold, spices, fur, or other items. The days of European conquests of the New World may have abated, but violent contests for natural resources still occur throughout the world. Consider in Africa, 21 the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where six countries are fighting to control gold, copper, diamonds, and timber. 22 Although Western interests in Middle Eastern oil tend to be more concerned with protecting access to petroleum rather than controlling it to the exclusion of other countries, it is not inconceivable that disputes for oil could turn into battles over controlling the resource.
The raw contest for control of resources by nation-states who simply need or desire wealth is one example of how the physical environment connects with potential conflict.
Michael Klare names three other kinds of conflict, where the control over the natural resource is connected to genuine sovereign claims of nation-states. 23 The first of these occurs when the supply of a natural resource extends across the boundaries of adjoining sovereign states. This is the case, Klare says, with an underground oil basin or a large river system. 24 As noted in the opening quotation from Boutros Boutrous-Ghali, Egypt's insistence on controlling the waters of the Nile has historically put it at odds with upstream African nations, such as Ethiopia and the Sudan. 25 Similarly, the concern that an adjoining country that shares a resource might make excessive use of it was one of Iraq's complaints against Kuwait in 1990. 26 A second point of contention can arise with respect to an offshore mineral resource where, by exercising sovereign rights of up to two hundred miles under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 27 multiple states may claim ownership of minerals located in relatively small bodies of water, such 21 See, e.g. GEORGE B.N. AYITTEY, AFRICA IN CHAOS 5-6 (1998) (noting the vast material wealth of the African continent and the interest of countries in exploiting that wealth). 22 Fishman, supra note 3, at 37. 23 See generally, KLARE, supra note 2. 24 Id. at 19. 25 See, ROBERT O. COLLINS, THE NILE (2002) (for a history of the ecological dimensions of the Nile River, particularly as effected by various hydroelectric projects, the attempts to control the river, and the geopolitical rivalries spawned by issues of such control). 26 Id. at 22. See also Philip K. Verleger, Understanding the 1990 Oil Crisis, THE ENERGY J., Oct. 1990 , at 15 (asserting that preceding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein claimed that Kuwait was stealing oil from the disputed Rumaila field and producing in excess of its OPEC quota). 27 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M 1261.
as in the Caspian Sea. 28 Third, disputes over control of bodies of water, such as the Persian Gulf or the Suez Canal may cause conflict as well. 29 Disputes over any of these four resource-based issues may well spill over into other contests relating to ethnic tensions, as will be described later, but they are important in their own right. In particular, consider the potential problems with respect to the resources of oil and water.
Mixing Oil and Water: The Economization of Foreign Policy
Oil and water are critical for industry. 30 Moreover, oil and water are also finite resources that can foreseeably become exhausted in the twenty-first century. Estimates of global oil supplies suggest that there is enough oil to sustain global requirements into the middle part of the century with potentially significant shortages occurring in the second or third decade of this century. 31 Similarly, although the earth has vast quantities of water, only three percent is fresh water, including a significant amount of that in polar ice caps and glaciers. 32 With population growth and higher standards of living, the middle part of the twenty-first century may also see 100% usage of the available supply of fresh water.
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Similarly, petroleum-based fuels currently account for ninety-five percent of the world's consumed transportation energy. 34 There is every reason to believe that the demand for oil, for both transportation and other energy uses, will increase substantially in the future, particularly in Asia and Latin America. 35 In China and India alone, countries home to almost half of the world's population, oil consumption is projected to rise 3.8% annually. 36 China Sea, with its reserves of petroleum and natural gas, and Japan has adopted a defense program to protect shipping lanes around the country. 49 In part, these efforts are simply a continuation of any sovereign's attempt to protect resources important to a given political entity, but when economic development becomes central to a country's foreign policy, then protection of resources necessary for that development becomes critical.
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This economization of foreign policy has two particularly significant consequences.
First, competition is increasingly acute because the supply of oil is concentrated in a few places, oil of Norway, Lukoil of Russia, and the China National Petroleum Corporation, and most attempt to partner with state-owned local concerns. 70 To succeed, however, the companies and the governments must be able to work without an established framework for determining who has rights to offshore drilling in the Caspian Sea. 71 Perhaps more significantly, there are also issues concerning how to transport the oil and natural gas to port because the Caspian Sea is landlocked. 72 As a result, the oil and natural gas will need to pass through pipelines.
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Passing oil through pipelines is not a benign decision. Indeed, in Afghanistan, the decisions made to determine where Russian oil should pass had dark consequences. After the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, the country fell into chaotic struggles for control, with no clear authority in the country. 74 In 1994, some ex-mujahideen fighters allied with Mullah
Mohammed Omar challenged the stronger warlords. In the meantime, several oil companies wished to build a pipeline across Afghanistan to carry oil to Pakistan, seeing the potential for revenue from shipping and transportation if the oil were transferred from Pakistani ports to tankers headed to oil dependent countries. All the while the success of Mullah Omar did not go unnoticed. 75 Impressed by Omar's success, the Pakistani government provided aid for Omar's group, which the Pakistanis named "the Taliban," to expand its control from Kabul and
Kandahar to the rest of the country to secure the corridor necessary for the pipeline. 76 The subsequent history of the Taliban is now, unfortunately, well known after its support of Osama 
b. The South China Sea
As noted above it is anticipated that Asia's economic development will spur additional demand for energy. 79 China's energy needs are expected to double between the years 2000 and 2020 and Japan's needs are expected to increase by twenty-five percent within the same time period. 80 Together, this would result in these two countries consuming twenty percent of world energy by 2020 -an amount that is equivalent to the consumption of all of Western Europe and Latin America combined. 81 China can turn to coal, which it possesses in abundance, but burning coal results in significant air pollution as well as major contributions to greenhouse gases.
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Given China's desire to be the dominant Asian power, as well as its desire to not become dependent on foreign sources of energy, one would expect it to turn its attention to the South 88 See id. at 111-112 (since countries such as Japan and South Korea are dependent, they need to seek to prevent the continued flow of resources through the sea, and whichever country controls the flow has transport sovereignty).
each of these countries. 89 The explosive part of this scenario involves the overlapping claims for economic development rights in this region and the military means to enforce those claims. 90 A clash already occurred in 1995 between China and the Philippines over a small islet called Mischief Reef.
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One question for South China Sea development involves the potential willingness of various countries to go to war for the zones they claim. Although with respect to all oil development involving unsettled claims of sovereign control, whether in Africa, the Caspian Sea, the Middle East, or the South China Sea, the actions taken by corporations to contract with various governments affects geopolitical resolutions of power and influence. Oil, in short, is not simply about governmental decisions, but also about competition among oil companies.
Competition for Water
Related to the issues presented by competition for oil are the similar and perhaps more volatile issues surrounding competition for water. With almost three hundred river basins crossing national boundaries 92 and a six-fold increase in worldwide water use between 1900 and 1995, 93 it is not surprising that many commentators predict that contests for water will be a source of violent conflict in the twenty-first century. 94 Like oil, water crosses boundaries, giving rise to potential disputes over its use. 95 Additionally, water supply is finite and once readily known supplies are depleted, it is very costly to obtain additional amounts. 96 And with the use of water so dramatically increasing, flashpoints are bound to occur. An additional unknown factor is the potential impact that may result from changes in the global climate.
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More specifically, flashpoints revolve around increasing needs for water as a result of increasing populations. These include both needs for drinking water and water for industrial and 89 Id. at 119-120 (the coastal irregularities and the numerous islands make determining boundaries in the South China Sea extremely difficult The combination of increasing population and inaccessibility of much of the fresh water supply complicates its efficient distribution. Increasing populations mean that more people need water to drink, and more land devoted to agriculture. Yet, most of the world's arable land is already under cultivation, so that to make additional land productive, irrigation will be required.
Irrigation is dependent on accessing remote water supplies. 101 To make matters worse, human beings are able to access less than one percent of the world's fresh water supply because most of the earth's water is trapped in the polar regions and glaciers. 102 After precipitation, evaporation and transpiration, the balance of the annual replenishment of the earth's water supply amounts to forty thousand cubic kilometers. 103 Half of this is currently lost through flooding and another twenty-percent is carried off into inaccessible locations, such as Siberia. 104 This leaves only 12,500 cubic kilometers of water annually renewable for various human uses, an amount that is probably double existing population needs. 105 Yet, affluence tends to increase water use; for instance, the world's population doubled between 1950 and 1990, but water use (resulting from indoor plumbing, appliances, and the consumption of meat) increased by three hundred percent. 106 It is foreseeable that, with increased population and increased affluence, human beings could fairly quickly reach all of the renewable freshwater and, although underground aquifers are available, once they are used, they -like oil reserves -cannot be replenished.
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Desalinization is a possibility but is currently very costly. An additional perhaps more significant difficulty is that water availability is not evenly dispersed, but is instead concentrated 98 Id. at 142-143. 99 Id. in areas that are either already impoverished or also struggling with potential conflicts regarding oil. 108 The Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia are particularly prone to water shortages and huge population increases. They are also already the subject of territorial disputes, some connected with petroleum.
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With many groundwater resources traversing existing national boundaries and with predictions that by 2025 two-thirds of humanity will suffer from moderate to severe water stress, the opening quotation from Boutros Boutros-Ghali 110 that future wars will be fought over water may bear some truth. In addition to the Nile, which is shared by several countries, four countries share the Tigris-Euphrates system and the Jordan River is shared by three countries and the Palestinian Authority.
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In contrast to Boutros-Ghali's assertion that future wars will not be about politics, but water scarcity, it is important to see that politics is inherently a part of the water conflict. Without making judgments as to the relative merits of various allocations, the perception created by this difference fuels animosity in the basin.
Business Complexities
In recognizing the collisions between resource availability, population growth, and geopolitical quests for power, it is tempting to simply characterize these as issues of concern among nation-states. Yet, this characterization would be simplistic. Thus, contests for natural resources are one example of how violence may erupt. Often, however, it is not simply the possession of resources that gives rise to conflict. As already noted, for instance, river basins that are shared by populations with different ethnic and religious memberships make it possible for contests over natural resources to also have a flavor of identity-based conflict. 157 The Caspian Sea area has long had deep ethnic divisions; and the arrival of competing oil companies has exacerbated those divisions. 158 The same is true of contests for lootable resources, such as diamonds and timber; they are embedded within historic antagonisms. 159 As a result, it is also important to examine how ecological issues can inflame identity-based tensions.
In his research on environmental scarcity and its connection to violence, Thomas HomerDixon concludes that scarcity itself does not cause violent conflict, nor rarely does violence have a single cause. 160 Yet a great deal of violence, particularly with respect to violence occurring within preexisting borders, is causally related to environmental scarcity. 161 This includes violence that has occurred in Chiapas, Mexico, South Africa, Pakistan, the Philippines, and
Haiti. 162 Homer-Dixon suggests that scarcities of cropland, freshwater, and forests contribute to violence by generating social stress that fosters "subnational insurgencies, ethnic clashes, and urban unrest" and that developing countries are particularly prone to these disturbances because they are typically dependent on natural resources. 163 Thus, apart from the specific competition for a particular resource, it is also important to see how competition, or the spillover effects from such contests, can contribute to identity-based tensions that, in turn, can result in violence.
Uneven Distribution of Resources
Just as energy and water resources provide an initial lens through which to examine competition over natural resources, it is helpful to contextualize the issues that can arise from identity-based conflicts. Homer-Dixon notes that forty percent of the people on the planet use fuel-wood, charcoal, straw, or cow dung as their main source of energy and up to sixty percent rely on these fuels for at least a part of their primary energy needs. 164 More than 1.2 billion people do not have access to clean drinking water. 165 The allocation of valuable resources is highly desired and the potentially increased marginalization of those mired in this level of poverty is likely to breed resentment. There are at least two ways in which the distribution of resources can exacerbate simmering identity-based tensions.
The first maldistribution concerns resource capture or structural scarcity. 166 This occurs when some groups in a given society are able to recognize the value of scarce resources and then act to control large percentages of those resources. 167 Frequently, these powerful groups also 160 HOMER-DIXON, supra note 19, at 7. 161 Id. at 7. 162 Id. 163 Id. at 12. 164 Id. at 13. 165 Id. Similar situations exist in Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, West Africa, Nigeria, the former Yugoslavia, and Russia. 183 The concentration of wealth, however, engenders hostility within countries that can be expressed when majority rule democracy comes with it; the majority then has the capability of scapegoating the wealthy minority, almost always with strongly ethnic overtones. 184 Chua argues further that this dynamic has consistently resulted in actions of mass murder by the minority against the market-dominant majority; Rwanda is another case in point as are actions in Zimbabwe against white farmers and actions against Chinese in Indonesia.
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Even more controversially, Chua argues that the same dynamic is at work with respect to Arab resentment of the regionally market-dominant power in the Middle East, Israel, 186 and against the United States as a globally market-dominant power in the September 11 attacks. 187 Thus, according to Chua, governments frequently take on the character of a privileged minority group in the position to benefit itself, at least as long as they can effectively control power and make arrangements to minimize opposition.
Environmental scarcity adds to this dynamic. It is one thing to observe that another ethnic group has better cars or homes. It is another if that other group has clean water while one's children suffer from dysentery caused by drinking dirty water. As already demonstrated, this is one of the problematic perceptions articulated in the ongoing disputes between
Palestinians and Israelis on the West Bank. 188 Given the expected population increases in those countries where access to a critical, basic resource such as water is expected to become even 178 Id. at 6-7. 179 Id. harder to obtain, the prospects that environmental scarcity will provoke increased ethnic hostilities exists. Adding to the potential is the visual connection provided by contemporary telecommunications and the Internet, where impoverished, suffering populations can see the glitter of the West.
A second maldistribution concerns what is done with the leftovers of resource use; that is ecological marginalization. 189 This scenario occurs when the structural distributions already in place join with population growth so that the poor, again typically from the same impoverished ethnic groups, are forced into ecologically marginal living quarters such as upland hillsides, land subject to desertification, and tropical rain forests. 190 This psychological resentment is not necessarily different from that of resource distribution generally; but living in a marginalized area contributes to ethnic resentments that can lead to uncontrollable eruptions. As is the case with the location of petroleum and water, these resentments tend to be found in critically important areas of the world. 191 These places include South Africa, Mexico, Pakistan, India, and China, the latter two countries comprising over forty percent of the world's population.
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In both of these cases, the distribution of either benefits in terms of desired resources or costs in terms of living in degrading conditions, does not typically happen across a demographically neutral board. Instead, certain groups tend to be favored while others tend to be disfavored. Environmental scarcity thus sharpens the potential grievances of rivalries that may often already be simmering in a given country.
Struggle to Control Identity
A related but distinguishable category is the struggle to control identity. The previous discussion concerning the distribution of resources concerned primarily material costs and benefits as well as the social psychological reaction to them, this second category relates to threats to more spiritual identities. These too, can create the conditions for ethnically related violence.
189 HOMER-DIXON, supra note 19, at 16. 190 Id. 191 Id. at 18-19. 192 Id.
Nile, 194 or the Kunene River separating Angola and Namibia, 195 bodies of water, like other natural resources often embody a deep manifestation of the identity of people. These identifications are critically important. Thomas Friedman characterizes those things that anchor human beings to a rooted identity as "olive trees" and writes, "[o]live trees are important. They represent everything that roots us, anchors us, identifies us and locates us in this world -whether it be belonging to a family, a community, a tribe, a nation, a religion or, most of all, a place called home." 196 Although globalization allows for greater interaction among people to cooperate on a range of things that bordered-up societies previously could not have allowed, it also means that within countries, there remains the tug of the olive tree. 197 Re-routing and damming of rivers, clear-cutting forests, and punching holes in the ground can challenge the identities of people for whom these natural things have spiritual significance. Globalization also challenges cultures in that things that were familiar are now gone, replaced by something strange. To the extent this causes consternation in France about the prevalence of Big Macs and Mickey Mouse, this may not be a huge issue. 198 At the same time, as Friedman argues, when there is a sense that a community has lost control of its economic vitality, as has been the case when financial markets move money in and out of a country virtually overnight, 199 one is left with the feeling that no one is in charge except for an arbitrary, faceless market. 200 But, as Israeli political theorist Yaron
Ezrahi notes: "The most arbitrary powers in history always hid under the claim of some impersonal logic -God, the laws of nature, the laws of the market -and they always provoked a backlash when morally intolerable discrepancies became glaringly visible. The Enlightenment was really the globalization of science and rationality and the backlash came when every thief, crook, exploiter and fraud claimed that whatever he was doing was necessitated by science and logic. The same could happen with globalization." 201 It is noteworthy that since the end of the Cold War, fewer than ten percent of contemporary wars have begun as interstate conflicts, but issues of religious, ethnic, or national identity have spurred two-thirds of wars. 202 In the West, where since the Enlightenment, it has been common to hear concerns raised about religious wars, 203 and statistics that show that over half of the wars had a religious dimension may not be
surprising. Yet, it is surprising that religious belief systems, which always venerated peace, are so intimately connected with contemporary conflict.
Scott Appleby, a leading authority on fundamentalist religious groups addresses one aspect of this. Appleby concedes that raising the specter of violence is not normal for most religions, but argues that often the justification for resorting to violence is an argument that the times are not normal. 204 Indeed, evidence suggests that many times this characterization is made by groups faced with new threats. Appleby argues that religious extremists typically do not mobilize orthodox believers; instead, they concentrate on the young and untutored during a time when outside pressures threaten traditional ways of life. 205 Thus, by shrinking time and space through communications and transportation technologies, modernity has made it much more likely that Sikhs, Buddhists, Christians, Jews, Hindus, Muslims, and nonbelievers live in close proximity to one another, especially in large urban areas around the world. In this globalized milieu, religious extremism -with the violent intolerance of outsiders -has become the response of choice for a disproportionately influential minority within traditional religious communities that feel threatened by the new pluralism. 206 If believers, again typically the young and untutored, think they are threatened, then there is an obligation to fight the enemy by any means. 207 The threat is that orthodoxy has not adequately responded to the secular, pluralistic, materialist, feminist West. 208 Fundamentalist leaders who are often charismatic mold an attitude of absolute devotion to the will of God, demonizing the infidel, focusing almost exclusively on a very narrow subset of religious doctrine as being the key to religious truth and connecting that truth to political goals. Appleby's account is respectful of religion as a whole, noting how religion can also be militantly devoted to peace. 211 In his account of fundamentalism, extremists distort a religious tradition that might otherwise be a force for nonviolence. A more cynical view of religion, consistent with Varynen's and Chua's analysis of how a minority group can seize control of government and orient policies for personal benefit, is presented by anthropologist Jared
Diamond. 212 Diamond argues that, historically, human beings tended to live in relatively small bands comprised of between five to eighty people, most of them closely related to each other.
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Although there were differences among the relative authority of individuals within these groups, a common feature was that the groups were relatively egalitarian. 214 There were no formal stratification of class hierarchy, no formal legal institutions, such as the police or even codes of law, and no monopolies of information or decision-making. 215 Yet human beings, beginning in the last few tens of thousands of years, also lived in tribes (usually populated by hundreds of people), clans, and chiefdoms. 216 Tribes, 217 like bands, also tended to be relatively egalitarian with little institutional formality.
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When chiefdoms arose 7,500 years ago, there was potential for greater conflict because people lived in close proximity with others they did not know. Historically, those reasons were to: (a) disarm the common people and arm the elite; (b) make the common people happy through redistribution of resources; (c) use force to create satisfaction through maintenance of a safe, public order; and (d) create an ideology or religion justifying the theft. 222 The last solution typically came in the form of a notion of the divine connection of royalty. 223 Moreover, the state ideology was able to bind non-kin together in conjunction with a common good that would justify even death for the welfare of others. 224 The idea of dying for the state, however Diamond argues, was unthinkable for bands and tribes. 225 Patriotism, he argues, was an unknown commodity. 226 Diamond argues that fanaticism in war was probably unknown until about six thousand years ago, the time when the great world religions emerged. An overarching issue with respect to sustainability is the extent that a consumptiondriven economy can be supported by the natural environment. Evidence mounts daily that humanity will be confronted this century with major consequences resulting from climate change. 228 Fossil fuels are thought to be the major cause of the greenhouse gas problem. 229 A central threat of climate change is a potential partial melting of polar icecaps, which would raise sea levels and cause severe costal flooding. 230 This connection of fossil fuel and flooding presents an entirely different dimension of the issues of oil and water described above. 231 Not only may oil and water be depleted, but there are also impacts on cropland scarcity, tropical deforestation, and depleted fish stocks.
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The world is faced with a complicated, difficult ecological condition which could provide the breeding ground for many kinds of violence, justified by those who believe that the current system has not treated them fairly. 233 It may be comforting to believe that these issues are the province of governments. It seems somewhat unrealistic to believe that governments can solve these issues without the engaged thoughtfulness of the business sector.
II. The Business Implications
Regardless of whether the evidence is sufficient to insist on the accountability of business to the connection of war and peace, many places around the world are already making the connection. As we have already noted, Shell Oil Co., a company currently recognized for its social responsibility efforts, was once vilified for its alleged complicity in the oppression of the Ogoni people in Nigeria and its alleged involvement in the assassination of rebel leader Ken Saro-Wiwa. 234 Exxon has faced protests from human rights organizations for not confronting human rights abuses perpetrated by security forces protecting Exxon's pipeline in Indonesia. 235 breaking windows and smearing the walls with cow dung after it was learned that, contrary to previous announcements, its French fries were cooked in oil containing beef tallow rather than in It may or may not be fair for businesses to be targets for protests and it also may be true that governments are responsible for managing the resulting conflicts. But business is involved in all of these issues. Although it may not be a moral requirement for corporations to take responsibility for the issues connected with violence, it would benefit both business and society if they did. As Thomas Friedman puts it, "Arab nationalism, socialism, fascism or communismwhile they may have made no economic sense, had a certain inspirational power. But globalization totally lacks this. When you tell a traditional society it has to streamline, downsize and get with the Internet, it is a challenge that is devoid of any redemptive or inspirational force.
And that is why, for all of globalization's obvious power to elevate living standards, it is going to be a tough sell to those millions of people who still say a prayer before they ride the elevator." Regardless of the particular source, approaching issues of ecology and war draw upon the approach we have articulated. That is, preventing war is not about one thing. It is about many things. Business finds itself in the midst of most all of them and, as a result, has some contribution to make to all of them. A balanced approach of economic development, openness to 244 See HOMER-DIXON, supra note 19, at 28-31. 245 Id. at 206-07. Human beings are simply biologically predisposed to work in small groups. Diamond supra note 211. It may be the case that this predisposition has frequent negative consequences, but it is an aspect of human nature that must be acknowledged and, can be utilized for positive outcomes. 246 Id. at 110. 247 HAWKEN, et al., supra note 1, at 15. As an example of the possibilities of biomimicry: " [b] usiness is switching to imitating biological and ecosystem processes replicating natural methods of production and engineering to manufacture chemicals, materials, and compounds, and soon maybe even microprocessors. Some of the most exciting developments have resulted from emulating nature's life-temperature, low-pressure, solar-powered assembly techniques, whose products rival anything human-made. Science writer Janine Benyus points out that spiders make silk, strong as Kevlar but much tougher, from digested crickets and flies, without needing boiling sulfuric acid and high-temperature extruders. The abalone generates an inner shell twice as tough as our best ceramics, and diatoms make glass, both processes employing seawater with no furnace." external evaluation, building community (including ecological citizenry), and track-two diplomacy, can mediate many of the tensions exacerbated by natural resource stresses.
III. Disease and War
As products of nature, human beings are also directly affected by ecological and biological elements. Just as human beings need natural resources, particularly water, in order to exist, so also a disruption in biospherical equilibrium can make life impossible. Thus, the issue of disease and war is not neutral when it comes to the lethal nature of disease; war enhances it and sometimes promote it. Nor is business neutral to disease. Outbreaks of disease, such as sudden acute respiratory syndrome, can wreak havoc on economic affairs. So here again, business has an interest in the containment of disease and because war works against that containment, disease can be seen as something of the ultimate ecological challenge to human life -the challenge to our physical bodies.
War can foster deadly diseases as an incidental weapon and by undermining the capability of societies to control their spread. Jared Diamond argues that Europeans were able to have military success and dominance over native populations because Europeans had guns, the nastiest germs, and steel. 248 In the Spanish conquest of the Incas, Francisco Pizarro's band of 168 soldiers were able to rout an Incan army of eight thousand without any Spanish casualties.
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The use of horses, the sharpness of Spanish weapons, and the protective armor provided against mumps, whooping cough, small pox, cholera, leprosy and a disease resembling typhoid fever, all introduced by Westerners. 254 Between 1520 and 1618, Mexico's population is estimated to have dropped from 20 million to 1.6 million from disease. 255 For the New World as a whole, the native population is estimated to have been reduced by as much as 95% within two centuries following Columbus's landing. 256 More than swords and spears, most of the killings came from smallpox, measles, influenza, typhus, diphtheria, malaria, mumps, pertussis, plague, tuberculosis, and yellow fever. 257 A possible reason for the lack of immunity of native peoples and the robust immunity of
Europeans is the prevalence of domesticated animals. Diamond argues that, with agriculture, a smaller amount of land was able to feed larger groups of people who lived in nomadic huntergatherer bands. 258 Larger societies possessed their own military advantages over small bands in terms of manpower, but in addition, the domestication of animals led to their trained use. This increased the possibility for specialization once animals were trained and fewer hands were needed to provide food, people could instead make weapons and build buildings and larger governments. 259 Moreover, because domesticated animals, including household pets such as dogs and cats, carry with them disease, the resulting density of human and animal populations allowed their immune systems to develop, even in the face of highly mutated diseases such as smallpox, measles, and flu. 260 These mutated diseases may have been frustrated by the immunities of Europeans and their animals, but the diseases faced no resistance from native populations. 261 Agricultural societies then, with their specialization of labor, their stores of food to feed armies, their ability to support large populations, and their ability to build up resistance to diseases were at a tremendous advantage over populations of native peoples. 262 As Diamond rather colorfully puts it, a naked farmer has no advantage over a naked hunter-gatherer, but because the farmer breathes out nastier germs (excluding the possibility that he may also have armor and horse), the farmer is more likely to prevail. 263 The densities accompanying urban life make the immunity issue even more pronounced. 264 Globalization and its associated mobility puts people into contact with each other at a rate previously unimagined. 265 And, not surprisingly, fatal diseases such as AIDS have been linked to infections that seem to have jumped from animals (specifically monkeys in Africa) to human beings and have spread very quickly around the world due to mobility and the lack of immunity to the disease. 266 Disease thus represents a major ecological threat to the physical well-being of human beings and that threat is one that has been part of violent conquests of other peoples. The basic threat to ecological devastation as a part of warfare has an unfortunately deep history. 267 Even in warfare, at least until World War II, and probably continuing in wars in emerging countries, more soldiers die as a result of disease than wounds. 268 The reason for battlefield deaths through disease is that battlefields do not posses public health infrastructures. Battlefields are not designed for providing safe drinking water, shelter from the elements, and pristine latrines. What occurs on the battlefield can be a spillover effect from war itself insofar as public health infrastructures are destroyed as battles are fought or, in an age where the separation between civilian and military populations may not be valued, attacking the infrastructure may even be a tactical decision.
"War [is] not healthy for children and other living things." 269 The actual collision with weaponry can be fatal, but war also loosens diseases. Once disease outbreaks, as in the case of AIDS for instance, it is difficult to control it. Disease itself wreaks human ecological destruction in ways sometimes even more devastating than fighting battles.
violence in the world. And if they do not do this, then who will?
We propose sustainable peace as an aim to which businesses should orient their actions both for reasons of the good of avoiding the activities that contribute to the spilling of blood as well as for the promotion of sustainable economic enterprises, which are fostered by stable, peaceful relationships. Thus, business must do what it does best and address economic development, even in terms of the extraction of natural resources. But it must also be attentive to the rights of others, to the development of community and meaning, and to stop violence when it is likely. Given the dangers ecological stresses pose for the planet, it is hard to think of a more compelling reason to reorient business behavior.
